Madison's Militia

February 1, 2023

What was the historical context in which the Second Amendment was drafted by James Madison, adopted by the First Congress, and ratified by the states? Bogus (emeritus, Roger Williams Univ. Sch. of Law; The Second Amendment in Law and History) pursues that question with the findings of his decades of research. His 10 chapters conversationally draw heavily on debates at Virginia's 1788 ratifying convention in Richmond. Their arguments were drawn from the right to bear arms provisions in the Declaration of Rights and state constitutions and from the First Congress's treatment of the text. England's 1689 Declaration of Rights contained the original provision, and many today believe the right to bear arms was always about protecting liberty. This book, however, demonstrates conclusively that the amendment's roots lay in enslavers wanting to have the right to have weapons to use against freedom seekers. VERDICT Readers interested in the Second Amendment's origins or in assessing arguments about its meaning will likely and deeply appreciate this comprehensive history.--Thomas J. Davis

Copyright 2023 Library Journal, LLC Used with permission.

January 9, 2023
Bogus (Buckley), a law professor at Roger Williams University, investigates why James Madison wrote the first draft of the Second Amendment in this provocative and persuasive history. Contending that the primary reason for the amendment was to assure Southern whites they would be able to maintain armed local militias to help prevent slave rebellions, Bogus traces the history of militias in America and claims that the 1739 Stono Rebellion in South Carolina and other insurrections left white Southerners “petrified.” Bogus also cites the poor performance of militias during the Revolutionary War as proof that Madison and America’s other founders “knew that militiamen would be unable to go toe to toe with professional soldiers.” On the other hand, Bogus argues, as a Virginian and owner of some 100 slaves, Madison understood the importance of protecting slaveholders and controlling the enslaved population if the Southern economy was to survive. After the War of 1812, Bogus notes, then-president Madison recommended that Congress “maintain ‘an adequate regular force’ in peacetime.” Careful analysis of the ratification process and Madison’s political career buttress Bogus’s thesis, even if his case is largely circumstantial. Still, this is a vital reconsideration of a contentious constitutional amendment.